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NOTES 
DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CABLE 
TELEVISION SYSTEMS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ALIEN OWNERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF 
THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 
L INTRODUCTION 
Alien ownership of the means of communication has been pro-
hibited or curtailed by nations throughout the world.1 This has 
been primarily true of broadcast communications,2 where the 
owner, operator, or licensee originates and transmits radio 
messages indiscriminately over a geographic area. Justifications 
for prohibiting alien ownership include considerations of national 
security,3 national identity,' and development of the national 
economy.5 In Canada, for example, restrictions are imposed on 
1. See generally Lent, Introduction, in BROADCASTING IN ASIA AND THE p ACIFIC 
passim (J. Lent ed. 1978); B. PAULU, RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN EASTERN 
EUROPE 8-21 (1974); Head, Introduction, in BROADCASTING IN AFRICA: A CONTINENTAL SURVEY 
OF RADIO AND TELEVISION 8-12 (S. Head ed. 1974); B. PAULU, RADIO AND TELEVISION BROAD· 
CASTING ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT passim (1967) (discussing the restriction imposed on 
ownership of communication systems). 
2. See supra note 1. In the United States," '[b]roadcasting' means the dissemination 
of radio communications intended to be received by the public, directly or by the in-
termediary of relay stations." 47 U.S.C. § 153(0) (1976). In Canada, "broadcasting" means 
any radio communication in which the transmissions are intended for direct reception by 
the general public. Broadcasting Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. B-11, § 2 (1970). 
3. Considerations of national security were the motivating factors behind the alien 
ownership rules included in the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-607 (1976) (as 
amended). See Federal Communications Commission: Hearings on H.R. 8301 Before the 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Com., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 160-73 1934; Federal Com-
munications Commission: Hearings on S. 2910 Before the Comm. on Interstate Com., 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. passim (1934) (statement of Capt. S.C. Hooper, Director of Naval Com-
munications); H.R. REP. No. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1934); S. REP. No. 781, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 1-3 (1934). 
4. Canadians have resisted foreign cultural domination since the birth of mass media 
in the early 1920's first gave Canadian citizens direct access to foreign culture and values. 
See P. RUTHERFORD, THE MAKING OF THE CANADIAN MEDIA 124-28 (1978); E. HALLMAN & H. 
HINDLEY, BROADCASTING IN CANADA 22-30 (1977); M. HINDLEY, G. MARTIN & J. MCNULTY, 
THE TANGLED NET: BASIC ISSUES IN CANADIAN COMMUNICATIONS 62-100 (1977); SPECIAL 
SENATE COMM. ON MASS MEDIA, I THE UNCERTAIN MIRROR 193-226 (1970). 
5. Prohibitions against alien ownership serve to keep the profits generated by com-
munications entities in the hands of nationals, thereby making it more likely that profits 
will be reinvested in the national economy.See CAN.REV. STAT. ch. B-11,§ 3(1970).See also An 
Act to Amend the Income Tax Act, CAN. REV. STAT. ch. C-58, § 106 (1976) (an Act prohibiting 
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foreign ownership of broadcast stations, cable systems,6 and com-
mon carriers.7 In the United States, the Communications Act of 
19348 prohibits alien ownership of broadcast stations and, to a 
limited extent, common carriers.9 Current administrative inter-
Canadian advertisers from deducting advertising costs where the ads were broadcast on 
U.S. stations along the U.S.-Canadian border). 
6. Canadian statutes do not define "cable systems," except to classify them as 
"broadcasting receiving undertakings." CAN. REV. STAT. ch. B-11, § 2 (1970). The United 
States government defines cable systems as: 
A nonbroadcast facility consisting of a set of transmission paths and associated 
signal generation, reception, and control equipment, under common ownership and 
control, that distributes or is designed to distribute to subscribers the signals of 
one or more television broadcast stations, but such term shall not include (1) any 
such facility that serves fewer than 50 subscribers or (2) any such facility that 
serves or will serve only subscribers in one or more multiple unit dwellings under 
common ownership, control or management. 
Cable Television Service, 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(a) (1980). 
7. The Canadian Broadcasting Act of 1968 provides that "the Canadian broadcasting 
system should be effectively owned and controlled by Canadians so as to safeguard, enrich 
and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada .... " CAN. REV. 
STAT. ch. B-11, § 3 (1970). Canadian regulations applying to broadcast and cable entities fur-
ther provide that persons who are not Canadian citizens, eligible Canadian corporations, or 
foreign governments may not be issued licenses or renewals on or after Jan. 12, 1971. 
Eligible Canadian corporations are defined as any corporation: 
(a) That is incorporated under the laws of Canada or a province, 
(b) of which the chairman or presiding officer and each of the directors or other 
similar officers are Canadian citizens, and 
(c) of which, if it is a corporation having share capital, at least four-fifths of the 
shares having full voting rights under all circumstances and shares representing in 
the aggregate at least four-fifths of the paid-up capital are beneficially owned by 
Canadian citizens or by corporations other than corporations that are controlled 
directly or indirectly by citizens or subjects of a country other than Canada, ex-
cept that, in any case where, in the opinion of the Commission, notwithstanding 
that the corporation is one to which subparagraphs (a) and (c) apply, the corpora-
tion is effectively owned or controlled either directly or indirectly and either 
through the holding of shares of the corporation or any other corporation or 
through the holding of a significant portion of the outstanding debt of the corpora-
tion or in any other manner whatever, by or on behalf of any person, body or 
authority ... , the corporation shall be deemed not to be an eligible Canadian cor-
poration. 
376 CAN. CONSOL. REGS. §§ 2, 3, 4 (1978). 
8. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-607 (1976) (as amended). 
9. Alien ownership of broadcast stations is prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1976): 
(a) The station license required shall not be generated to or held by any 
foreign government or the representative thereof. 
(b) No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical enroute or aeronautical 
fixed radio station license shall be granted to or held by-
(1) Any alien or the representative of any alien; 
(2) Any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign govern-
ment; 
(3) Any corporation of which any officer or director is an alien or of 
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pretations of the Communications Act, however, do not prohibit 
foreign ownership of cable systems.10 The divergent treatment of 
cable ownership has produced tensions between the United States 
and Canada due to an imbalance in foreign investment oppor-
tunities.11 As Canadian cable operators increasingly avail 
themselves of the United States' liberal cable ownership rules,12 
pressures to impose alien ownership restrictions on American 
cable systems are likely to recur. 
This Note will explore the divergent treatment of cable 
ownership in the United States and Canada. The analysis will 
Id. 
Id. 
which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record or 
voted by aliens or their representatives or by any corporation 
organized under the laws of a foreign country; 
(4) Any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other cor-
poration of which any officer or more than one-fourth of the direc-
tors are aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock 
is owned of record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a 
foreign government or representatives thereof, or by any corpora-
tion organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commis-
sion finds that the public interest will be served by the refusal or 
revocation of such license. 
Alien ownership of common carriers is restricted by 47 U.S.C. § 222(d) (1976): 
No proposed consolidation or merger of telegraph carriers pursuant to this section 
shall be approved by the Commission if, as a result of such consolidation or 
merger, more than one-fifth of the capital stock of any carrier which is subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Commission will be owned, or controlled, or voted, directly 
or indirectly, (1) by any alien or the representative of any alien, (2) by any foreign 
government or the representative thereof, (3) by any corporation organized under 
the laws of any foreign government, or (4) by any corporation of which any officer 
or director is an alien, or of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned 
or controlled or voted, directly or indirectly, by any alien or the representative 
thereof, or by any corporation organized under the laws of a foreign government. 
One court distinguished broadcasters and common carriers in the following manner: 
Since given private and common carriers may therefore be indistinguishable in 
terms of the clientele actually served, it is difficult to envision a sensible line be-
tween them which does not turn on the manner and terms by which they approach 
and deal with their customers. The common law requirements of holding oneself 
out to serve the public indiscriminantly draws such a logical and sensible line be-
tween the two types of carriers. 
National Ass'n of Regulatory Utility Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (em-
phasis added). 
10. See In re Parts 76 and 78 of the Commission's Rules to Adopt General Citizenship 
Requirements for Operation of Cable Television Systems and for Grant of Station Licenses 
in the Cable Television Relay Service, 77 F.C.C.2d 73 (1980). 
11. See id. 
12. Wall Street J., Nov. 13, 1980, at 37, col. 4; Rogers Targets U.S. for Growth, 
Advertising Age, June 15, 1981, at 4, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1979, at D-1, col. 3. 
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begin with a discussion of the status quo and the traditional 
justifications for imposing alien ownership requirements on com-
munications entities. Second, an analysis of the Federal Com-
munications Commission's 1980 Report and Order13 will demon-
strate that the Commission failed to apply appropriate provisions 
of the Communications Act, thereby unlawfully allowing con-
tinued Canadian investment in U.S. cable systems. Finally, be-
cause the regulation of cable as an extension of the broadcasting 
system results in the creation of discrete, highly nationalistic sys-
tems of communications, the option of regulating cable as a com-
mon carrier will be explored to determine if a common carrier 
scheme would lead to more balanced international investment op-
portunities. 
IL PROHIBITIONS ON FOREIGN OWNERSHIP 
OF CABLE SYSTEMS 
A. REGULATORY HISTORY 
Both Canada and the United States generally prohibit foreign 
ownership or control of communications entities.14 In the United 
States, initial restrictions on direct foreign control were justified 
for reasons of national security .15 Alien ownership of cables and 
foreign control of radio stations during World War I caused Con-
gress to question whether the Executive's war powers16 were suf-
ficient to counteract foreign propaganda or foreign disruption of 
domestic communications in the event of war .17 The possibility 
that a foreign state could influence American citizens through the 
broadcast medium resulted in the alien ownership provisions of 
13. See supra note 10. 
14. Supra notes 7 & 8 and accompanying text. Scholars make the distinction between 
"direct" and "portfolio" investments. A direct investment provides the investor with 
managerial or operational control. On the other hand, portfolio investors are allowed to in-
vest up to a certain percentage of the equity. In the case of a broadcast entity, both Canada 
and the United States limit portfolio investment to twenty percent of the voting stock. Mc-
Carthy, Government Regulation of Foreign Investment in the United States, in CURRENT 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 84-5 (A.B.A. ed. 1976). 
15. See In re G.R.C. Cablevision, Inc., 47 F.C.C.2d 467 (1974) (foreign control of a 
microwave transmission facility poses no national security threat because owner does not 
control message content); note 3 and accompanying text. 
16. 47 u.s.c. § 606 (1976). 
17. Hearings on H.R. 8301, supra note 3, at 26; Watkins, Alien Ownership and the 
Communications Act, 33 FED. COM. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1981). 
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the Radio Act of 1927,18 and the Communications Act of 1934.19 By 
contrast, the Communications Act does not absolutely prevent 
aliens from owning common carrier services. Alien-owned corpora-
tions, however, may not consolidate or merge with domestic com-
mon carrier services.20 
While national security is an important justification for 
foreign ownership restrictions, other rationales exist. Canadian 
laws, for example, incorporate considerations of national identity 
and the development of the national economy as reasons for 
restricting foreign control of communications entities. 21 Canadians 
have been particularly sensitive to losing their unique cultural 
heritage if U.S. programming were allowed unfettered access to 
the Canadian broadcasting system. Accordingly, Canadians have 
decreed that both broadcast and cable entities should be in the ef-
fective control of nationals, thereby ensuring an outlet for cultural 
expression, as well as increasing the probability that revenues 
earned from the medium will be reinvested into new forms of 
cultural expression. 22 
Given such compelling reasons for limiting alien control of 
communications entities, one would expect both nations to pro-
hibit foreign ownership of broadcast stations and cable systems. 
The Canadian government has imposed a uniform alien ownership 
ban, which applies to both types of communication systems.23 The 
United States, however, has adopted a different approach, barring 
foreign control of broadcast stations but allowing foreign control 
of cable systems. 24 
18. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, § 12, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927) (repealed by 47 U.S.C. §§ 
85-119 (1934)). 
19. Supra note 8. 
20. Id. Note that if cable is characterized in the future as a common carrier service, 
the 1934 Communications Act will not prohibit aliens from initiating new service. The pro-
hibition will be triggered only when the alien seeks to merge with an existing service. 
21. See supra note 7. 
22. Gotleib, The Transnational Flow of Information: A Canadian Perspective, 1974 
AM. Soc·y OF INT'L L. PROC. 127, 133. Canadians, in addition to limiting alien ownership of 
communications entities, have also imposed limits on the amount of American programming 
which can be shown on Canadian television, as well as restrictions on the number of U.S. 
stations which Canadian cable operators may carry. See 381 CAN. CONSOL. REGS.§ 8 (1978). 
A Review of Certain Cable Television Programming Issues, 4 C.R.T. 890, 891 (1979); Johan-
sen, The Canadian Radio-Television Commission and the Canadianization of Broadcasting, 
26 FED. COM. L.J. 183 (1973). . 
23. Supra note 8. 
24. See supra note 10, and accompanying text. 
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Although the cable industry in both nations is owned by the 
private sector, disparate ownership rules have produced an im-
balance in investment opportunity. American direct investment in 
Canadian cable systems ended in the early 1970's, when U.S. cor-
porations, such as the Columbia Broadcasting System, were forced 
to divest their Canadian cable holdings.25 Meanwhile, Canadian 
direct investment in U.S. systems has increased. For example, 
Canadian Cablesystems Ltd., owned by Rogers Telecommunica-
tions of Canada, is one of the largest multiple system operators in 
the United States.26 Rogers, along with other Canadian cable 
operators, owns or controls systems in northern New Jersey; Fort 
Lauderdale and Clearwater, Florida; portions of central Illinois; 
Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; Fresno, Stockton, west 
San Fernando Valley and Orange County, California; suburban 
Minneapolis, Minnesota; portions of Wayne County, Michigan; 
Atlanta, Georgia; and Syracuse, New York.27 Industry observers 
predict that the trend will continue because the earning potential 
in the United States, measured on a per subscriber basis, is more 
than twice that of Canada.28 
B. THE STATUS Quo 
In Canada, cable is regulated as an extension of the broad-
casting system.29 The cable industry, therefore, is subject to the 
25. See Johansen, supra note 22. 
26. See Advertising Age, supra note 11, at 4, col. 1. MacLean-Hunter Cable TV, Ltd., 
a Canadian company with U.S. cable holdings, detailed the history of a divestiture in its com-
ments opposing the FCC's adoption of a rule that would bar alien ownership of cable in the 
United States: 
In 1967 [when ownership restrictions were being considered in Canada] nine of the 
ten largest cable companies in Canada were controlled by foreign owners. The 
nine foreign-controlled companies accounted for over 95% of the subscribers serv-
ed by the top 10. Foreign interests controlled 50% of the largest 50 companies and 
some three-quarters of the total subscribers served by the group. Nationwide in 
Canada, at that time, 55% of subscribers were served by foreigners. 
In re Parts 76 and 78 of the Commission's Rules to Adopt General Citizenship Requirements 
for Operation of Cable Television Systems and for Grant of Station Licenses in the Cable 
Television Relay Service, 77 F.C.C.2d 73, 77 (1980). The time period described by MacLean-
Hunter is prior to passage of the Broadcasting Act of 1968. 
27. Wall Street J., Nov. 13, 1980, at 37, col. 4. 
28. One industry observer has been quoted as saying that the earning potential in the 
United States per subscriber per year is about $200. In Canada, the figure is closer to $80. 
Wall Street J., supra note 27, at 37, col. 4. This disparity results from the numerous pay 
cable services available to U.S. subscribers, over and above the basic services included in 
the basic monthly fee. The recent creation of a Canadian pay cable service may lessen the 
disparity in earnings. See Wall Street J., Oct. 23, 1980, at 14, col. 2. 
29. See CAN. REV. STAT. ch. B-11, § 1(2) (1970). 
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same prohibition on alien ownership as broadcasters. The prohibi-
tion may be triggered in any of three situations: (1) the cable 
operator is a foreign citizen; (2) the domestic applicant has a 
foreign citizen serving on the board of directors, or as an officer; 
(3) foreign citizens control more than twenty percent of the 
domestic company's voting stock.30 The alien ownership ban has 
been interpreted expansively by the Canadian courts.31 For exam-
ple, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Com-
mission denied a cable license to a domestic firm which had pro-
posed to finance the cable system through a Canadian subsidiary 
of a non-Canadian finance company.32 A federal appellate court 
upheld the Commission's action, finding that the Broadcasting Act 
of 1968 gave the Commission discretionary power to deny licenses 
even where there existed only the potential for foreign take-over 
by the applicant's creditor.33 
The United States, by comparison, has been much more in-
decisive with respect to cable regulation. This results from a 
regulatory system that has been fashioned from an antiquated 
legal framework. Nowhere does the 1934 Communications Act 
mention cable technology. Thus, the FCC, and the courts which 
review its decisions, have had difficulty in deciding whether cable 
should be regulated as a common carrier under Title II of the Act, 
or as a broadcaster under Title III of the Act.34 Section 153(h)35 
creates two mutually exclusive categories under which the FCC 
may promulgate regulations - broadcast or common carrier. 36 In 
order to assert jurisdiction over a communications technology, the 
30. See supra note 7. 
31. See Cable Laurentide v. C.R.T.C., 114 D.L.R.3d 545 (Fed. App. Ct. 1980). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. Cf In re Data Transmission Co., 52 F.C.C.2d 439, 440, (1975) (Section 310's alien 
ownership provisions guard against actual alien control as opposed to the mere possibility of 
control). 
34. The cable industry itself has demonstrated an equal amount of indecisiveness in 
this regard. In the seminal decision endorsing FCC regulation of cable, the respondent cable 
company "conclude[d] that CA TV, with certain of the characteristics both of broadcasting and 
of common carriers, but with all of the characteristics of neither, eludes altogether the Act's 
grasp." United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1967). 
Id. 
35. 47 u.s.c. § 153(h) (1976). . 
36. "Common carrier" or "carrier" means any person engaged as a common car-
rier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio or in inter-
state or foreign radio transmission of energy ... but a person engaged in radio 
broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person is so engaged, be deemed a common 
carrier. 
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FCC needs to establish that the technology is reasonably an-
cillary37 to either broadcast or common carrier communications 
services. 
After an initial period of reluctance to regulate cable in any 
manner, the FCC decided in 1966 to regulate cable under its 
plenary authority to regulate broadcasting.38 This satisfied the 
broadcast industry, which feared that, absent regulation, cable 
operators would gradually decrease the number of television sets 
receiving local broadcast signals. 39 As this economic rationale fell 
out of fashion, however, the FCC removed itself from the 
mainstream of cable regulation. 40 
Today, the legal framework by which cable is regulated re-
mains nebulous. The Supreme Court's holding that the FCC may 
regulate cable as a service reasonably ancillary to broadcasting41 
has not been overruled by case law or congressional action. Nor 
has the FCC proposed to regulate cable as anything other than a 
broadcast-related service. Yet the selective enforcement of Title 
37. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172 (1967). 
38. Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). 
The FCC's decision to regulate the cable industry resulted from the broadcast in-
dustry's insistence that cable adversely affected local broadcasting and, in particular, UHF 
broadcasting. The FCC did not regulate cable under Title II or III of the Act: cable regula-
tion actually existed outside the authority of the Act but was nevertheless ancillary to the 
broadcast provisions. See Besen and Crandall, The Deregulation of Cable Television, 44 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 84-91 (1981); M. HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE: LEGAL AND 
BUSINESS ASPECTS OF CABLE AND PAY TELEVISION 543 (1979). 
39. See supra note 38. 
40. See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (striking down the 
FCC's requirement that cable systems maintain a community access channel); Cable Televi-
sion Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, 45 FED. REG. 60186 (1980) (to be codified at 47 
C.F.R. § 76); 49 F.C.C.2d 1090 (1974). For a summary of the effort to deregulate cable at the 
federal level, see Besen and Crandall, supra note 38 passim. 
The FCC has continued to regulate cable to a limited extent: 
In deleting these rules, we have maintained the distinction between programming 
on access type channels, whether provided voluntarily, or pursuant to state or 
local law, and programming subject to the system operator's editorial control. The 
specific requirements of the fairness doctrine (§76.205) and equal opportunities for 
political candidates rules (§76.209) will, as in the past, not be applied to access type 
programming, as long as the channels on which such programming is presented 
themselves have inherent in their functioning, access of a type which makes pos-
sible equal opportunities for political candidates and time for the provision of pro-
gramming covering all sides of controversial issues of public importance. For the 
time being we believe it appropriate to leave for case by case development more 
detailed definitions of what types of channels will meet this requirement. 
45 FED. REG. 76178, 76179 (1980). 
41. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
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III42 provisions against the cable industry, along with the failure to 
ban alien ownership, demonstrates that cable has been the subject 
of haphazard regulation. Interestingly, Congress has recently 
taken steps to define the regulatory status of cable and cable 
ownership provisions. A bill introduced in the Senate in 1982 
would have allowed the FCC to issue regulations banning alien 
ownership except in those cases where reciprocal investment op-
portunities are permitted. 43 A more recent version of the bill calls 
for the FCC to coordinate regulation of foreign ownership with the 
United States Trade Representative.44 
/IL THE FCC'S 1980 REPORT AND ORDER 
A. THE ORDER HAS No BASIS IN LAW 
If cable is to be characterized as an extension of the broadcast 
system, then the same policies which justify section 310's45 applica-
tion to a broadcast licensee should also apply to prohibit foreign 
ownership of a cable system.46 The FCC, however, has employed 
various rationales in disputing this theory. In a 1976 memorandum 
opinion and order, 47 the FCC pointed to recent congressional lib-
eralization of alien ownership provisions for related broadcast ser-
vices. The FCC stated that "[t ]he legislative history of this change 
indicated that the intention was to permit the grant of radio li-
censes in the safety and special and experimental radio services 
directly to aliens, representatives of aliens, and foreign corpora-
tions. Therefore, it appears, alien ownership of cable television 
systems is no longer restricted."48 The FCC did not explain why 
special and experimental radio services, which generally consist of 
42. 47 u.s.c. §§ 301-607 (1976). 
43. S. 2172, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 1657 (1982) (reintroduced as S. 66, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 325 (1983)). 
44. S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. 325, 326 (1983). 
45. 47 u.s.c. § 310 (1976). 
46. This is the view adopted by the Canadians. See supra notes 6 & 7. 
47. In re Amendment of Parts 76 and 78 of the Commission's Rules to Adopt General 
Citizenship Requirement for Operation of Cable Television Systems and For Grant of Sta-
tion Licenses in the Cable Television Relay Service, 59 F.C.C.2d 723 (1976). 
48. Id. at 724-25 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). The FCC noted that the 1974 
amendments to the Act allowed foreign ownership of the microwave relay stations servicing 
cable systems for the first time. Because these relay stations- termed Cable Television 
Relay Services (CARS)-were directly regulated under Title III as broadcasters, section 
310's prohibition on alien ownership had, up until 1974, been enforced against CARS 
licenses. CARS stations, often owned by local cable systems, had thus made possible the en-
forcement of section 310 against cable systems. Id. at 724. 
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private point-to-point or point-to-multipoint communications, are 
similar to cable television systems, which transmit a group of 
signals via wire to a large number of subscriber homes. The FCC 
also observed that foreign direct investment in cable, which so far 
has involved only Canadian citizens, has enhanced capital invest-
ment in the communications system.49 In short, a ban on alien 
ownership, said the Commission, would be a "cure for which there 
is no disease."50 
The FCC might have thought that Congress had ample oppor-
tunity to amend section 310 so that its provisions would explicitly 
apply to cable. The Commission failed, however, to consider 
whether the policies underlying section 310 required that the ban 
on alien ownership be applied to cable. Instead, the Commission 
analogized it to related businesses, as follows: 
Alien ownership restrictions do not apply to communicators 
generally, to newspapers, wire news services, non-license radio 
and television networks, film and television producers, cable 
system networks and channel lessees, and it is not clear that 
they should apply to a system operator solely because of his 
potential ability to influence, through his program origination ef-
forts, the ideas and attitudes of cable subscribers.51 
The analogy fails, however, because in all of the instances cited, 
with the exception of newspapers, the programming or informa-
tion passes first through an independent local gatekeeper or 
editor. 
In 1980, at the prompting of U.S. cable interests, the FCC 
issued a report and order endorsing the 1976 findings and advanc-
ing several new rationales.52 Among the rationales proposed were: 
(1) the amount of foreign ownership is insignificant and is likely to 
remain so; (2) the power that franchisees exercise over program-
ming is minimal; (3) the quality of service by the foreign companies 
is high; and (4) franchising is subject to extensive local scrutiny. 
Most significantly, the FCC found that all of the ownership in 
49. Id. at 727. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Supra note 10. Procedurally, the FCC decision arose from a cable industry request 
that the FCC promulgate a rule mirroring section 310, but instead applied to the cable in-
dustry. 
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question is connected to Canada, a country with "close and friend-
ly ties" to the United States.53 
While the aforementioned rationales have been factually con-
tested by domestic cable interests,54 only one of the reasons ad-
vanced by the FCC explains why the policies underlying the alien 
ownership ban for broadcasting should not be applied to cable: all 
of the ownership in question is Canadian and Canada has "close 
and friendly ties" to the United States. According to the FCC, this 
factor demonstrates that the national security rationale for pro-
hibiting foreign direct investment in broadcasting is not present 
to the same degree in the cable industry.55 The FCC did not con-
sider what effect this decision might have if an investor, from a na-
tion with interests more hostile to the United States, were to 
begin investing in cable. Presumably, if such a situation were to 
arise, the FCC could distinguish between the Canadian cable 
operators and the applicant from the more hostile nation. Yet such 
discrimination, based on the relative hostility of a nation, has no 
basis in law. The Communications Act does not authorize such a 
test, and nowhere has the FCC been delegated the authority to 
establish such a policy. 
Consequently, the absence of an FCC policy concerning en-
forcement of a foreign investment ban in cable television leaves 
the FCC open to attempts by other foreign investors to buy into 
the U.S. cable industry. Even if such policymaking authority could 
be found, the failure of the FCC to employ section 310 as the ap-
propriate statute indicates that a reviewing court has little on 
which to rely when deciding whether a foreigner should be allow-
ed to purchase a system. Instead of giving a court the relatively 
53. Id. at 77. 
54. For example, Canadian cable operators have recently announced plans for signifi-
cant amounts of new investment in the United States. See supra notes 12 & 28. This con-
tradicts the FCC's finding that the amount of foreign ownership will remain insignificant. A 
1980 rule eliminating a number of program exclusivity rules formerly applied to cable has 
increased the amount of discretion a cable operator possesses with respect to what is 
transmitted in the system. 45 FED. REG. 60186 (1980) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. § 76). This 
tends to refute the FCC's characterization that operators have only a minimal amount of 
control over programming. See In re Parts 76 and 78 of the Commission's Rules to Adopt 
General Citizenship Requirements for operation of Cable Television systems and for Grant 
of Station Licenses in the Cable Television Relay Service, 77 F.C.C.2d 73, 77 (1980). 
55. "Suggestions that ... foreign investment will lead to abuses of editorial discretion 
threatening the security of the United States are highly speculative and not supported by 
any evidence in this record." Supra note 10 at 81. 
11
Brown: Direct Foreign Investment In Cable Television
Published by SURFACE, 1983
124 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 10:113 
simple task of applying section 310 to potential cable owners, the 
FCC leaves the judiciary with the task of determining whether 
the foreigner's home nation is friendly to U.S. interests-a deter-
mination not generally within the judiciary's expertise. 
There is a second argument which demonstrates that the 
FCC decision had no basis in law. Section 153(h)56 requires that 
communications services be regulated either as a broadcast ser-
vice or as a common carrier service. By imposing even minimal 
regulation on the cable industry, due to its reasonably ancillary 
relationship to broadcasting, the FCC should apply section 310 to 
cable operators. If the FCC recognizes that cable functions, in 
part, in a way similar to broadcasting, section 153(h) requires that 
it be regulated as broadcasting. The language of section 310 does 
not allow the FCC to apply the alien ownership prohibitions at its 
own discretion. The structure of the Communications Act itself, 
therefore, requires that cable operators be subject to section 310 
as long as cable is regulated as a broadcast medium. 
B. THE RECIPROCITY ARGUMENT 
In urging adoption of a proposed rule to regulate alien owner-
ship of cable, the U.S. cable industry argued that the FCC should 
recognize and apply a principle of reciprocity.57 Thus, U.S. cable in-
terests would not seek an outright prohibition against alien 
ownership if the corresponding country allowed U.S. investors to 
own or control cable systems within that country.58 The National 
Cable Television Association argued that provisions of the Trade 
Act of 1974 demanded a level of reciprocity which the Canadians 
had failed to meet.59 The FCC, however, declined to adopt 
reciprocity as a policy for banning alien ownership of cable.60 
56. 47 u.s.c. § 153(h) (1976). 
57. The principle of reciprocity has been stated to take effect as follows: 
When one foreign government pursues a policy of discrimination and restric-
tion regarding U.S. commercial interests, the agencies and establishments of the 
United States are empowered to impose reciprocal limitations. Such limitations 
are not aimed at punishing foreign nationals or restricting foreign commerce. They 
are intended to expand international commerce by inducing the eliminations of 
barriers to it. 
Supra note 10 at 76. See also Reply Comments to the National Cable Television Association, 
Inc., Jan. 8, 1980 (filed in response to opponent's brief in the 1980 alien ownership report 
and order, 77 F.C.C.2d 73 (1980)). 
58. A theory of reciprocal opportunity had been employed by the Commission on two 
prior occasions. See id. at para. 6. 
59. Id. at paras. 3-4. 
60. The Commission stated that: 
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The Commission found that application of the principle of 
reciprocity "is a matter which we believe is appropriately con-
sidered by other branches of government."61 At first glance, this 
statement seems somewhat surprising in light of the FCC's broad 
powers to regulate communications in the public interest, conven-
ience and necessity.62 The FCC, however, properly recognized that 
there are limits to an administrative agency's ability to make 
foreign policy .63 Yet the FCC failed to realize that the agency's 
power to act had already been delegated by Congress through the 
enactment of section 310. Although the executive branch is 
generally considered to have been granted broad powers in the 
sphere of foreign relations,64 Congress gave the FCC specific 
powers to regulate alien investment in broadcasting. 
Reciprocity theories have recently been receiving congres-
sional attention. In hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on 
Communications, domestic cable interests argued that Canadian 
cable operators had grown rich by importing programming from 
the United States, which allowed the Canadian cable companies to 
prosper. These windfall earnings are now being used to compete 
with U.S. cable enterprises.65 The executive branch has opposed 
There is no showing in this proceeding that a reciprocal agreement would im-
prove communications service available in the United States. To the contrary, it 
seems likely that reciprocal treatment between the U.S. and Canada would merely 
reduce competition to provide cable television service in the U.S. 
Id. at 80. 
61. Id. at 79. 
62. 47 u.s.c. § 303 (1976). 
63. While the separation of powers doctrine has long been discredited as applied to 
administrative agencies, courts have recognized that limits do exist as to how far the dif-
ferent branches of the federal government can impinge on each other's functions: 
The fundamental necessity of maintaining each of the three general departments 
of government entirely free from control or coercive influence, direct or indirect, 
of either of the others, has often been stressed and is hardly open, to serious ques-
tion .... The sound application of a principle that makes one master in his own 
house precludes him from imposing his control in the house of another who is 
master there. 
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629-30 (1935). See Hearings on S. 2172 
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Com., 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 183-84 & 191 (statement of Bernard J. Wunder, Ass't Secretary for Communications 
and Information, NTIA, Dept. of Com.); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 23-25 (3d ed. 
1972). 
64. U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 1. See Lutcher S.A. Celulose E Papel Candoi, Parana, 
Brazil v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 253 F. Supp. 568 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967). 
65. See Hearings on S. 2172 Before the Subcommittee on Communications of the 
Senate Comm. on Com., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 494 (statement of William Bresnan, president 
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sectoral reciprocity, preferring to impose reciprocal cable invest-
ment opportunities through modification of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade.66 
In sum, the reciprocity theory advanced by U.S. cable in-
terests, in an effort to drive Canadian operators out of the United 
States, or to induce the Canadians to open their borders to U.S. in-
vestment, would have required the FCC to tread on the Ex-
ecutive's authority. As previously discussed, however, the FCC 
had no need to consider reciprocity. A strict reading of the Com-
munications Act compels a finding that direct foreign investment 
in cable should not be allowed, as long as cable is regulated as a 
broadcast medium. 
IV. INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF REGULATING 
CABLE AS A COMMON CARRIER 
By regulating cable as part of the broadcast system, Canada 
has vested ownership and control of the cable industry in Cana-
dian citizens. Ignoring for a moment the FCC's failure to apply the 
appropriate provisions of the Communications Act to cable,67 the 
United States should likewise prohibit alien ownership of cable 
systems. Thus, by regulating cable as an extension of the broad-
cast medium, cable must develop without the benefit of foreign in-
vestment capital or expertise. Blanket prohibitions on direct 
foreign investment have generally been criticized as being an-
tithetical to the spirit of international cooperation.68 
Nations are justifiably sensitive to foreign domination of their 
of Teleprompter Corp. and member of the National Cable Television Association Board of 
Directors). 
66. William E. Brock, special trade representative, stated the Reagan 
administration's position as follows: 
We obviously must develop a set of principles that make it clear to our 
trading partners that two way trade in this sector must be established consistent 
with international rules. At the same time, our strategy should not be fashioned in 
a way that narrows our considerations to the point where the telecommunications 
industry and the U.S. economy are the long-term losers. That is why I believe that 
sector-by-sector reciprocity is undesirable. 
Letter from William E. Brock to Sen. Barry Goldwater (May 28, 1982), reprinted in Hear-
ings on S. 2172 Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Com-
merce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 650. 
67. Supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
68. See H. Brownell, Foreign Investment in the United States Should Not Be 
Restricted, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 63 
(A.B.A. ed. 1976). Brownell states that "[r]eactive, overly nationalistic economic policies in-
variably lead to a breakdown in nearly all aspects of international relations. Given the cur-
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communications systems, which generally provide a vital link be-
tween a country's government and its citizens. Resolving the issue 
of whether or not to allow foreign direct investment, therefore, in-
volves the international community's ability to create a regulatory 
structure which allows for an open and interdependent' com-
munications system,69 but prevents foreign domination of owner-
ship or content. 
A. CABLE AS A COMMON CARRIER 
Cable technology initially developed as an extension of the 
broadcasting system.70 In United States v. Southwestern Cable 
Co. ,71 the Supreme Court identified two functions of cable systems: 
first, cable supplements local broadcasting by improving the quali-
ty of local reception;72 and second, cable allows broadcast signals 
to be imported from other communities.73 Moreover, because cable 
systems may easily originate local programming,74 the FCC initial-
ly mandated that cable operators produce their own 
programming. 75 Cable systems, therefore, were initially 
businesses which operated to produce their own local television 
programming, or to transmit broadcast television programming to 
their customers. In essence, the cable industry operated as an arm 
of the broadcast business. 
In Canada, the cable and broadcast industries stood in a 
similar relationship.76 The Canadian Supreme Court case In re 
rent potential for such a breakdown, a restrictive inward-looking policy towards foreign in-
vestment in the U.S. would be dangerous at this time." Id. 
69. Id. 
70. See Howard, Ownership Trends in Cable Television (1972-79), 58 JOURNALISM Q. 
288 (1981). 
71. 392 U.S. 157 (1967). 
72. Home reception is generally better with cable transmission as opposed to broad-
casting because the signal travels along an enclosed wire and is not susceptible to at-
mospheric interference. See M. HAMBERG, supra note 38 passim. 
73. Supra note 71 at 163. 
7 4. See supra note 72. 
75. See M . HAMBURG, supra note 72. Hamburg contends that the FCC did not regulate 
cable under the broadcast provisions of Title III. He interprets the regulatory history in a 
different way, arguing that the FCC regulated cable outside the scope of either Titles II and 
III of the Act. This theory is helpful in explaining why the FCC has been selective in enforc-
ing the provisions of Title III against cable operators. The theory does not address the issue 
of whether this haphazard regulatory approach should have been tolerated by the FCC, or 
the courts, in light of the bifurcated regulatory scheme mandated by section 153(h). Id. at 
543; Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
76. 83 D.L.R.3d 178, 181 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
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Republic Service Board,11 which upheld the authority of the 
federal government to regulate cable, identified the cable industry 
as functionally interrelated to the broadcast system. 78 The Cana-
dian court applied Canadian law, which explicitly declares cable to 
be part and parcel of the broadcasting system. 79 
The United States Supreme Court, applying statutes which 
do not define the legal status of cable, made essentially the same 
finding in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.80 "As the Commission, 
itself, has observed, both in their signal carriage decisions and in 
connection with their origination function, cable television 
systems are afforded considerable control over the content of the 
programming they provide."81 The Court, drawing heavily on the 
mutually exclusive rationale of section 153(h) to reach its conclu-
sion, found that the FCC could not regulate cable systems as com-
mon carriers.82 
Although both Canada and the United States have regulated 
cable as an extension of the broadcast medium, this method of 
vice: 
77. Id. 
78. The opinion provides a cogent rationale for regulating cable as a broadcasting ser-
The fundamental question is not whether the service involved in cable distribution 
is limited to intraprovincial subscribers or that it is operated by a local concern 
but rather what the service consists of .... There is another element that must be 
noticed, and that is that where televisions broadcasting and receiving is concerned 
there can no more be a separation for constitutional purposes between the carrier 
system, the physical apparatus, and the signals that are received and carried over 
the system, than there can be between railroad tracks and the transportation ser-
vice provided over them or between the roads and transport vehicles and the 
transportation service that they provide .... Divided constitutional control of what 
is functionally an interrelated system of transmitting through air waves or 
through intermediate cable line operations, not only invites confusion but is alien 
to the principle of exclusiveness of legislative authority a principle which is as 
much fed by a sense of the constitution as a working instrument as by a literal 
reading of the words. 
Id. at 181. 
79. Supra notes 6 & 7. 
80. 440 U.S. 689, 707 (1979). This case struck down FCC rules mandating that cable 
systems reserve access channels on a first-come, first-served basis. See United States v. 
Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
81. Id. 
82. In light of the hesitancy with which Congress approached the access issue in 
the broadcast area, and in view of its outright rejection of a broad right of public 
access on a common-carrier basis, we are not constrained to hold that the Commis-
sion exceeded those limits in promulgating its access rules. The Commission may 
not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose such 
obligations on television broadcasters. 
Id. at 708-09. 
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regulation ignores the essentially hybrid nature of the 
technology.83 Since cable either can act as a transmission agent or 
originate its own programming, cable can function as a common 
carrier, and a broadcaster simultaneously.84 At present, cable is 
neither a pure form of broadcaster nor a common carrier. Cable 
operators, for example, can originate programming and choose 
which programs will appear on their other channels. Unlike broad-
casters, however, cable operators are not held to the public in-
terest standard;85 they have no legal responsibility for the content 
of this programming.86 Nor do cable operators function as pure 
common carriers because most of their channels are not available 
on a first-come, first-served basis. 
Access channels, or leased access channels, are examples of 
common carrier style services and may be mandated by the fran-
chise agreement. Furthermore, the current mode of regulating 
cable may place the cable operator, by virtue of the local origina-
tion channel, in competition with those programming services 
which must depend on the system for economic survival.87 While 
the United States does not mandate that systems carry origina-
tion programming,88 many may be required to do so by their local 
franchise agreements.89 
83. Cable is a unique communication medium, for in addition to its ability to relay 
programming and information supplied by others, it can also originate its own 
material. This serves to distinguish the cable operator from a broadcaster who, for 
instance, is able to exercise control of the programming broadcast by his station, 
and from the common carrier who exercises very little control. 
59 F.C.C.2d 723, 725 (1976). 
84. Id. 
85. See Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, supra note 40. Besen 
and Crandall, supra note 38. 
86. That is, no responsibility other than the constitutional restraints of libel or 
obscenity, except when the operator engages in origination programming. 47 C.F.R. 
§§ 76.205-76.221 (1982). 
87. A Canadian study concluded: 
[l]t is a desirable principle that a carrier should not be permitted to use its 
technological resources to compete with those who have to depend on its services. 
In these respects, the cable industry is in an anomalous position. A cable company 
is able to produce and distribute television programming of its own, potentially in 
competition with the signals of the broadcasting stations and networks it 
distributes, and is not subject to regulation on the principles that are accepted as 
applicable to other telecommunication carriers and to public utilities. 
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR CANADIAN 
SOVEREIGNTY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CANADA 17 (1979). 
88. Cable Television Syndicated Program Exclusivity Rules, supra note 40. 
89. Compare Besen & Crandall, supra note 38 at 121 (underscoring the importance of 
the local franchise agreement as a regulatory method). 
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By contrast, treating cable as a pure form of common carrier 
would allow a variety of programming services first-come, first-
served access to cable channels.90 Because the owner of the com-
mon carrier service, by definition, has no control over content,91 
the policies which underlie the prohibition on alien ownership 
have little applicability.92 A Canadian study of the regulatory 
framework of cable systems93 recently recommended that Canada 
undertake regulation of cable as a common carrier, largely 
because the cable industry is in the process of evolving into a pro-
vider of a variety of information services.94 The Canadians argue 
that cable systems, like telephone systems, constitute a natural 
monopoly95 which, in the future, should carry news, information 
and entertaiment to subscriber homes. 
B. ALIEN OWNERSHIP OF COMMON CARRIERS 
Unlike broadcasting, alien ownership of common carrier ser-
vices is not prohibited by law in either the United States96 or 
Canada.97 The United States prohibits alien-owned corporations 
from merging with existing carriers, but does not prohibit an 
alien-owned corporation from initiating a new common carrier ser-
vice.98 Canadian law is slightly more stringent with respect to 
foreign ownership of common carriers, but does not absolutely 
preclude aliens from owning common carriers in all situations.99 
These liberalized ownership rules may be explained by reference 
to the policy considerations underlying the broadcasting ban. 
90. See definition of common carrier, supra note 8. 
91. Id. 
92. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text. 
93. Consultative Committee, supra note 87. 
94. Id. at 21-22. 
95. The Canadians distinguish the natural monopolies of cable or telephone companies 
from those of broadcasters on the grounds that broadcasters do not offer their facilities to 
third parties. "[T]his is quite different from the monopoly enjoyed by a telephone company 
and the exclusive right of a cable company to distribute broadcast signals in an identified 
geographical area free from any competition." Id. at 18. 
96. See 47 U.S.C. § 222(d) (1976). 
97. Canadian General Radio Regulations provide, for example, that some common car-
rier services which require use of the broadcast spectrum, such as stations which relay 
signals between broadcasters or cable operators, may be owned by Canadian citizens or cor-
porations incorporated within Canada. 1371 CAN. CONSOL. REGS.§ 1(5) (1978). The law does 
not, at least facially, prohibit foreign companies from incorporating subsidiaries within 
Canada for the purpose of operating common carrier services. 
98. 47 u.s.c. § 222(d) (1976). 
99. See supra note 97. 
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National security is less important in the common carrier context 
since the owner of the existing service does not control the con-
tent of the messages and thus, cannot influence those receiving 
the messages. Considerations of national identity, 100 likewise, are 
not a concern for the same reason. Finally, due to the rate regula-
tion101 associated with common carrier services, tariffs could be 
structured so that profits earned would be reinvested in the 
domestic communications system.102 
Because Canada and the United States are among the few 
countries in the world which are, to a significant extent, cabled,1°3 
there is some difficulty in drawing generalized conclusions regard-
ing the international practice of direct foreign investment in cable. 
The expected growth of cable into a provider of common carrier 
services further complicates the analysis. If, however, Canada and 
the United States are considered as models, some limited conclu-
sions can be made with respect to the commercial practices 
100. The extent to which a communications system can control national identity or 
culture has been a major concern of those nations who advocate a new world information 
order. "Information is the basis of culture. The greater the foreign information, the greater 
the threat to a native or domestic culture." MCPHAIL, ELECTRONIC COLONIALISM: THE 
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS 244 (1981). 
101. In the United States, cable systems have their rates established by agreement 
with municipalities. In Canada, rates are established at the federal level by the Canadian 
Radio-Television Commission. The way in which rates are established, however, is essential-
ly the sam~: the governmental body decides on a rate that is based on "value for service" 
considerations. See CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, supra note 87 at 19; M. HAMBURG, supra note 
38 at 687. 
102. The Canadians have proposed separating rate regulation of content and carriage. 
A study committee found that such a separation would facilitate the transformation of cable 
to a common carrier service. The alternatives suggested by the committee were: 
1. preserve status quo: allow cable to engage in content production and program-
ming as well as carriage under regulation with traditional carriers limited to car-
riage only. 
2. absolute separation: no carrier engaging in content. 
3. remove all regulation. 
4. divide market: cable distributes broadcasts and direct feed television with new 
services go to traditional carriers. 
5. separate, but allow cable companies and other carriers wishing to engage in 
content operations to do so only via "arm's length" subsidiaries with separate 
board of directors, management and full cost separation. 
6. separate, but allow exceptions if a carrier is well suited to provide the content 
operation. 
7. combinations of 5 and 6 by allowing exceptions through subsidiaries 
(FA VO RED BY COMMITTEE). 
CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, supra note 87 at 20. 
103. STATISTICS CANADA, CABLE TELEVISION (1978) (1979). 
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regarding direct foreign investment in cable. If cable is regulated 
as a common carrier, there does not appear to be a legal bar to 
allowing foreign investment.104 Nor do there appear to be compel-
ling policies for enacting alien ownership .prohibitions. At the 
same time, the highly regulated nature of a natural monopoly 
would permit a nation to limit the amount and kind of foreign 
direct investment. In other words, the movement to a common car-
rier scheme would not require that nations abandon their com-
munications systems to alien citizens or corporations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regulation of cable systems as common carriers would have 
several beneficial ramifications, both domestically and inter-
nationally. First, common carrier regulation is more consistent 
with the new types of services cable will be providing. Canada has 
already begun to re-evaluate its method of regulating cable.105 The 
United States should do likewise. Second, the recognition of cable 
as a common carrier would allow the United States to continue to 
permit Canadian investment in cable without risking the chance 
that a nation more hostile to the United States will gain partial 
control of the content of the programming or information system. 
Common carrier regulation would, nevertheless, allow aliens to 
communicate their views through the system in competition with 
others in society seeking to disseminate their views. An environ-
ment of balanced investment opportunities is thereby created, 
alleviating the current atmosphere of unfairness. 106 
The practices established by the United States and Canada 
may serve as a model to other nations seeking to develop cable 
systems and regulations governing them. While the creation of a 
regulatory framework that permits balanced investment oppor-
tunities may seem trivial in the context of two communications 
giants, such as Canada and the United States, the consequences 
for other countries with less developed communications systems 
are important. Direct foreign investment in a cable common car-
rier scheme may well prove to be financially the most viable 
104. See supra notes 96 and 97. 
105. The Consultative Committee's Report is but one example. See also 8 ROYAL COM-
MISSION ON NEWSPAPERS, THE NEW TECHNOLOGIES (1981). 
106. Indeed, one of the complaints levied against the FCC's current policy is the un-
fairness of allowing Canadian investment in United States systems while U.S. investors are 
barred from Canada. Supra note 57 at para. 3. 
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means of providing new technologies. A common carrier format 
allows nations to take advantage of new technologies without the 
risk of losing control of the content of their communications 
systems to foreign nations. 
Mary Louise Brown 
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